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Abstract
This article addresses the question of whether operational efficiency is recognized
and rewarded by the private funders that support nonprofit organizations in fields ranging
from education to social service to arts and beyond. Looking at the administrative efficiency
and fundraising results of a large sample of nonprofit organizations over an 11 year period,
we find that nonprofits that position themselves as cost efficient – reporting low
administrative to total expense ratios – fared no better over time than less efficient appearing
organizations in the market for individuals, foundations, and corporate contributions. From
this analysis, we suggest that economizing may not always be the best strategy in the
nonprofit sector.
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Today, the nonprofit sector plays an increasingly important role in the provision
of vital services in fields such as health, social services, and education. The size of the
nonprofit sector has increased rapidly over the past 50 years from a little more than
12,000 organizations in 1940 to over 1.5 million organizations today, including 501(c)(3)
public-serving nonprofits that are organized for religious, educational, charitable, and
scientific purposes, as well as a host of member-serving nonprofits, such as business
leagues, social clubs, and labor associations (Borris 1999). While the sector has grown
quickly, serious questions have arisen in recent years about the funding and management
of these organizations, particularly the public-serving nonprofits that grant their
supporters a tax deduction for their contributions. In response to contributors’ concerns
following a series of highly publicized financial scandals at nationally prominent
charities,1 the field of nonprofit management has quietly undergone a period of self-
examination aimed at bringing greater financial controls and tighter operations to the
sector (Bryson 1996; Kearns 1996; Pappas 1995; Letts, Ryan &Grossman, 1999).
Reforms in the way nonprofit organizations operate have been aimed at reassuring the
public that contributions are being wisely applied to the core charitable missions of these
organizations.
The rapid rise in the number of nonprofits seeking a piece of the limited amount
of private contributions (Boris 1999) has increased competition within the sector and
2made it harder for many of these organizations to achieve long term financial stability.
Charitable nonprofits raise funds through two principal means (Hansmann 1981). The
first is through the charging of fees for the delivery of services or the creation of
commercial ventures designed to generate a stream of earned income. Over the past two
decades, these “commercial” forms of revenue have become a critical source of operating
funds, one that has given nonprofits the ability to launch and sustain initiatives by having
clients and consumers pay for part or all of the cost of delivering services (Weisbrod
1999). The second way nonprofits support their operation is through donations and
grants. By emphasizing the public-serving nature of their work, many “donative”
nonprofit service providers are able to elicit a stream of contributions that provides
critical working capital for their operations (Gronbjerg 1993). For organizations that
work with disadvantaged populations or that seek to provide a service for free or at a
subsidized price, contributed income is often a critical ingredient in their financial
strategy. Today, there are few entirely donative or entirely commercial nonprofit
organizations. In the face of a tight market for contributions, many nonprofits have
attempted to alter and diversify their funding bases from a predominant reliance on
contributions toward a more balanced approach that includes earned income. All the
while, there remains a significant ongoing need for contributed income to fund those
activities that are part of the mission of a nonprofit organization but not easily supported
by client payments.
Against the backdrop of these financial pressures, we examine in this paper the
factors that drive private contributions to nonprofit organizations. Because nonprofits
have received a great deal of advice on how to manage their operations efficiently, we are
3interested in the question of whether strategic positioning around efficiency, defined as
the reporting of a below average administrative to total expense ratio, increases the
contributed income that a nonprofit organization is able to raise over time. Beyond a need
to build legitimacy and donor confidence that may underlie the “new bottom-line”
movement in the nonprofit sector, there has been much talk about the growing
sophistication of philanthropy, evidenced in the expectation of donors that their
contributions be well spent. This research asks how much reality lies behind this new
rhetoric and whether the funders of nonprofit organizations have indeed begun to take
more seriously the efficiency of the organizations they support. Thus, while the efficient
management of nonprofit organizations may serve a range of purposes, we are interested
here in whether it has an impact on an organization’s ability to attract public support as
measured by contributed income.
The paper moves toward an answer in four steps. First, we set the stage by
considering the background issues and previous research related to this question. Second,
we define the research hypotheses that guided our work. Third, we present our model and
analyze the findings. Finally, we conclude with some broader reflections on the question
of nonprofit management and accountability.
I. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
To date, research on the private funding of the nonprofit sector has tended to focus on
donor motivations. Starting with the question of what determines the amount of giving, many
studies have looked at the sensitivity of contributions to various changes in the external
funding environment. The goal of this work has been to explain donor decisions and to do so
4almost always without taking into consideration the activity of the recipient organizations.
Studies of individual charitable contributions have modeled donations as a function of
disposable income and the price of giving as measured by the price of contributions
(Clotfelter 1985). This work has argued that the current policy of allowing donors to deduct
charitable contributions from their income is a more effective tool for stimulating donations
to charitable organizations than lowering income tax rates and allowing individuals to have
greater disposable incomes. In short, this research has found that the price elasticity is greater
in absolute terms than the income elasticity.  In the field of corporate contributions, the
impact of taxation on giving has also been studied, though the results are more mixed
(Navarro 1988). Studies of the giving patterns of private foundations have focused on the
multiple roles and responsibilities that frame the strategic decisions that foundations make
about how to use their resources (McIlnay 1998). In these and other cases, modeling and
theorizing has tended to treat the contributions process from one side, where the donor is
actively involved in weighing alternatives and where the recipient is a passive vessel of
benevolence.
Another important line of inquiry is the relationship between other sources of
nonprofit revenue and private donations. Specifically, this research addresses whether
government grants and contracts “crowd out” charitable contributions (Brooks 2000; Kigma
1989; Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Steinberg 1993). The findings are mixed, however, across
various subsectors and geographic regions with some studies finding evidence of a partial
crowd out effect and other studies finding opposite evidence of a partial “crowd in” effect.
Nonetheless, the thrust of this literature has been to evaluate the responsiveness of  various
revenue streams without explicitly taking in account the actions of the nonprofit itself.
5In this article, we start with a different set of concerns and assumptions about
contributions to the nonprofit sector. Rather than begin with the question of what determines
the amount of contributions made by supporters of nonprofit organizations, we draw on a
different research tradition, one that starts with the role that information asymmetry (Akerlof
1970) plays in the market for charitable contributions and that more recently has asked the
question of what determines the fundraising success of nonprofit organizations (Kelly 1997).
Far from being bystanders to the deliberative process of donors, nonprofit organizations are
in fact actively engaged in courting supporters by pressing the importance of their mission.
This positioning is a critical part of the giving process since it determines what information
reaches donors as they make their decisions on where to direct their funds. The most basic
form of positioning is around mission. Nonprofits define themselves around the causes they
are established to serve, which they hope the public views as important enough to support
through both volunteering and charitable giving. As the public shifts its attention to issues
ranging from homelessness to early childhood education to famine relief, different sectors of
the charitable market benefit from successive surges of public support. Because an
organization’s mission is not usually subject to quick or radical change, maintaining financial
support over long periods of time can be a difficult task. Donors are notorious for
experiencing “compassion fatigue,” as the demand for charitable resources for what seems
like an endless range of causes marches on and on. Over the past two decades, there has been
a conscious effort to change some of the dynamics of the contributions game and to help
nonprofits find a dimension other than mission on which to position themselves, namely
managerial and administrative efficiency. This has led to an explosion of handbooks and
6management manuals designed to give nonprofit leaders tools to improve their operations
(Light 2000).2
On a daily basis, many nonprofit managers are confronted with a long list of
challenges, including staff turnover, unreliable volunteers, difficult clients, and
demanding funders. As a consequence, the successful nonprofit manager must be
constantly working to find ways to sustain the myriad of complex personal relationships
that together allow a nonprofit organization to pursue its mission. While all nonprofits
would like to develop long-term organizational plans and improve management practices,
a harried agency director may, more often than not, be drawn to focus on the more
immediate objective of simply making it through the day and keeping the organization
afloat. Of course, some well-funded nonprofits have succeeded in freeing themselves
from these mundane constraints, but many organizations, particularly community-based
service agencies, struggle mightily simply to keep their programs functioning. Funders
have become increasingly selective in their awarding of gifts and grants to nonprofits.
Under-financed and duplicative nonprofit organizations have had to contend with the
inability of private funders to finance the explosive growth of this sector. One
consequence of this development has been the rise in nonprofit bankruptcies and closings
(Hager, Galaskiewicz, Bielfeld, and Pins 1996). What then is a nonprofit organization to
do?
One popular response has been that nonprofit organizations need to manage better
and more efficiently in the new competitive and performance driven world they now face.
Improving management has been seen both as a way of raising operational effectiveness
and a method of reducing costs. Dozens of books now aim to help nonprofit practitioners
7improve their organizations and manage more effectively and efficiently (Antos and
Brimson 1994; Dropkin and LaTouche 1998; Drucker 1992; Eadies and Schrader 1997;
Firstenberg 1996; Pynes and Schrader 1997; Wolf 1990). Many of these titles attempt to
bring business concepts such as reengineering, quality management, and benchmarking to
bear on the nonprofit sector, usually with the intent of raising the level of organizational
and program performance. A common theme that emerges from these texts is that the
absence of a traditional bottom line in the nonprofit sector – far from freeing nonprofits
to blindly pursue their missions – means that these organizations must manage especially
well and develop a special kind of operational discipline. Though rarely expressed
directly, these books suggest that a management lag between nonprofit and business
sectors can be closed with a direct transfer of managerial technology.
The push toward efficiency and performance has been fueled by the rapid
professionalization of large parts of the nonprofit sector over the past three decades
(Frumkin 1998). Many professional staff want to bring a new rigor to their work and
develop standards to measure their performance, both as the basis for their own
advancement within the field and in the effort to build a growing body of expert
knowledge. For professionals, the ideas of reengineering processes, introducing quality
management systems, and benchmarking are appealing because these techniques hold out
the promise of supporting and justifying the move from volunteer labor to well
compensated professional staffing. With their desire to avoid charges of amateurism that
have plagued this sector in the past, the growing ranks of nonprofit professionals have
turned out to be the perfect audience for claims that cost effectiveness represents the new
frontier of nonprofit management.
8As professionalism has set in, competition for contributed income has intensified,
particularly among start-up organizations. Many nonprofit managers confront the fact
that there are often several nonprofit organizations with similar missions operating close
by one another with little coordination. In some fields, the competition has gotten quite
heated. In the case of international relief, efforts to win support have led to efforts at
differentiation around overhead costs and programmatic efficiency. Knowing that
individual donors to famine relief would, all things considered, prefer to see their funds
reach those in need at the lowest cost possible, many relief agencies have come to
compete for the distinction of having the lowest administrative and overhead costs -- a
competition that is encouraged by the media, which regularly publishes, particularly
around the holidays,  ratings of charities designed to lead donors to lean and well run
organizations. Under such conditions, it would appear that few mangers could afford to
ignore the question of cost efficiency, measured often in terms of the ratio of
administrative to total expenses. Of course, the categorization of costs as either
administrative or programmatic is a subject of considerable dispute and little practical
guidance exists (Wilson, Hay and Kattelus, 1999). This imprecision, in turn, can be seen
as having the potential of intensifying the inclination of nonprofits to enter into the
efficiency positioning game, since standards for challenging claims of efficiency are
difficult to locate.
At the same time, foundations and corporations have become increasingly tough
minded in their dealings with nonprofit organizations (Freund 1996). Within institutional
philanthropy there has been a move to gain greater levels of control over the entire
grantmaking process. The most visible manifestation of this move has been the rise of
9project grants, which now outnumber general operating grants by a ratio of close to three
to one (Foundation Center 1998). Individual contributors, who together donate more than
foundations and corporations combined, have also become more aggressive in the way
they conduct their philanthropy. Although many small contributions are made on a wish
and prayer, larger individual donors have begun seeking more information before making
commitments and then demanding greater involvement and engagement with the
organizations they support (Miller 1997).
For nonprofits, changes in the way large institutional contributions are made has
meant more fund-raising work and more post-grant work as well. To satisfy grantmakers,
nonprofit organizations must now -- at a minimum -- specify in great detail how funds
will be spent, discuss their plans with foundation staff, submit to a site visit, write a
project narrative, and provide a financial report on the project. The greater level of
oversight and heightened emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency have necessitated the
recruitment and training of program staff who know not only how to provide services but
also how to handle donors and the new rigors of securing contributed income.  This has
led to an even greater emphasis on fundraising skills within the sector and to the rising
salaries of development professionals (Duronio 1997).
There are currently significant limits to the ability of the contributions market to
absorb and use information, however. Although many nonprofits are required to file on
an annual basis a financial disclosure form with the Internal Revenue Service and then
make this information available to the public upon demand, it remains unclear how well
this information shapes the contributions decisions of many donors (Chisolm 1995).
Foundations and corporations routinely scrutinize audited financial statements and public
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reporting forms, but small individual contributors rarely inquire in any depth into an
organization’s finances.  In addition, there is considerable concern about the accuracy of
the information detailed on the federal reporting forms because of the vagaries of some of
the categories and because audits of nonprofit organizations have become an increasing
rarity. The IRS has only a small enforcement office that has struggled to keep up with the
explosive growth of the sector (Gaul and Borowski 1993, Greene and Williams 1995).
Still, the information contained on the reporting forms can help us understand how many
nonprofit organizations present themselves to the public. This public disclosure of
information represents an organization’s most visible statement of its financial condition
and managerial priorities.
II. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Talk of “social investments” rather than “grants” and “social return on
investment” rather than “stewardship” have become popular in recent years (Emerson
1996). The question that remains to be answered is whether the changes that have swept
across the funding landscape reflect a new rhetoric for philanthropy or whether these
changes have transformed the contributions market into one where the business of
benevolence takes seriously the performance of recipient organizations. A good way to
address this question is to look at nonprofit organizations to see whether those that have
followed the growing literature on nonprofit management and tightened operations have
been rewarded with greater levels of contributed income.
Therefore, the first hypothesis we test reflects the position that efficiency matters
and that it is recognized and rewarded in the market for contributions. H1 incorporates
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the underlying assumptions of the new literature on nonprofit management and the push
towards greater attention to the bottom line within nonprofit organizations.
H1: Nonprofit organizations that have low administrative to
total expense ratios and that appear efficiently managed will
have more success raising contributed income than
organizations that have higher administrative expense ratios.
The second hypothesis we test rests on the assumptions held by some practitioners that
competition for contributions does not take place in a well-functioning market where
information about nonprofit performance is scrutinized and where efficiency is rewarded.
Instead, H2 argues that the best predictor of an organization’s ability to solicit
contributions is the amount of money that the organization spends selling itself and its
mission to donors in every way imaginable, from face-to-face solicitation of major gifts
to mass mail appeals to small contributors.3  What matters most is not how well a
nonprofit is run from a managerial point of view or how efficiently it marshals its
resources to accomplish its goals, but rather how well it “sells” itself to the public. H2
affirms that philanthropy may have developed an impressive business-based lexicon, but
that the majority of giving remains idiosyncratic and emotive.
H2: Nonprofits that spend more on fundraising or marketing
will have more success raising contributed income than
organizations that spend less on fundraising or marketing.
By testing these two opposing propositions, our goal is to understand whether strategic
positioning around operational efficiency is rewarded by donors or whether effective
mission marketing ultimately drives charitable giving to nonprofit organizations.
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III. DATA & METHODOLOGY
The data for this analysis is drawn from information provided to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) by nonprofit organizations that are required to file an IRS Form
990 information return (Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax). The data set
covers the period 1985-1995.  Although nonprofit organizations are generally exempt
from paying income tax, they must nonetheless file an annual return with the IRS
reporting detailed financial and other activity for the year. Three important categories of
nonprofit organizations are not required to file IRS Form 990 information returns:
religious organizations, private foundations, and nonprofit organizations with gross
receipts less than $25,000.
 In order to qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, the primary mission of the organization must be charitable, religious,
scientific, literary, educational, or promote public safety, prevent cruelty to children or
animals, or foster amateur sports competition.  Operating under this broad umbrella of
exempt purposes that has been amended and extended over the years, nonprofit
organizations not only enjoy the benefits of income tax exemption but also donors are
entitled to deduct charitable contributions from their income tax returns.  Yet each
nonprofit organization must serve the public good as opposed to private gain in order to
maintain exempt status.  Thus, exempt organizations may not distribute their net earnings
(i.e., profits) to shareholders or other individuals but rather must use them to further the
mission of the organization.
A. Sample Selection
Following common practices in setting up a panel study, our sample consists of
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only those nonprofit organizations appearing in each panel year.  This balanced panel
consists of 2,359 nonprofit organizations, yielding a total of 25,949 observations.  This
panel constitutes a stratified random sample of the universe of nonprofit organizations
that are required to file an IRS Form 990 information return. The IRS adopts a stratified
sampling approach in which the sample is classified into five strata based upon total asset
size with each stratum being sampled at a different rate (IRS 1991; 1993).
B. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our model is private donations in a given tax year.
Some researchers have cautioned, however, that a potential problem may exist because of
the confusion of nonprofit managers over the various contribution categories of the IRS
Form 990 (Froelich and Knoepfle 1996; Froelich 1997). To account for this possibility,
we perform a separate analysis of our model using total contributions as the dependent
variable.  We report our results in the following section.  A natural logarithm
transformation of both variables was used in the regression analysis.
C. Independent Variable
The independent variable in our model, efficiency, measures the ratio of
administrative expenses to total expenses in a given tax year. This is the most common
way to measure administrative efficiency in nonprofits. It is a measure that is sometimes
employed by auditors and accreditors to compare the operations of organizations with
similar missions, with the goal of seeing which have the leanest operations. In our model,
this variable is employed to measure differences in operational efficiency among
nonprofits working in common subsectors as defined by the National Taxonomy of
Exempt Organizations (NTEO). Our model includes the following major category groups
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of the NTEE: arts, education, health, human service4, public benefit5 and other6.  By
measuring efficiency within subsectors and seeing if it is a good predictor of
contributions, we take a first step toward testing our main hypotheses.  In order to address
potential issues of simultaneity, we use the lagged value of efficiency in our model.
D. Control Variables
The following four variables were included as controls in the regression analysis:
(1) program expenditures or the amount of money dedicated to service delivery or core
mission-related work; (2) fundraising expenditures or the amount of money spent on
marketing a nonprofit organization to donors with the goal of securing contributions;
(3) total revenue or the amount of money flowing into the organization each year from all
sources; and (4) government grants and contracts or the amount of money flowing into
the organization each year specifically from government sources. A natural logarithm
transformation was performed on each independent variable in order to facilitate the
analysis. As with our independent variable, we use the lagged value of each control
variable in our model to address potential issues of simultaneity.
E. Model Specification
A simple pooled cross section time series model that is estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS) will not yield consistent coefficient estimates if unobserved firm-
specific characteristics have a unique but constant impact upon charitable contributions.
In this case, the simple pooled model will suffer from omitted variable bias.  Moreover,
diagnostics performed on the sample reveal the presence of first-order serial correlation.7
We correct for these problems by using a general least squares (GLS) estimator.
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IV. RESULTS & ANALYSIS
We began this investigation with the question of whether efficiency – reflected in
below average administrative to program expenses – helped nonprofit organizations in
the marketplace for contributions. We looked at the influence of efficiency on
contributions within the major fields of activity that nonprofits populate. This means we
sorted organizations by their areas of activity (i.e., arts, health, education, human service,
public benefit, and other) and then asked whether being more efficient than the
competition in one’s own field yielded greater levels of contributions. Our belief is that
few donors make their charitable giving decisions by comparing, for example, an arts
organization to a hospital. Instead, we believe that donors are more likely to compare one
nonprofit day-care center to another nonprofit day-care center.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the entire sample including the means,
standard deviations, and pooled correlation matrix for all 11 panel years of data.  Table 2
presents the results of our regression model.  The results of our analysis indicate that
reporting low administrative to total expense ratios and positioning an organization as
efficient does not lead to greater success in garnering contributions. In none of the six
fields of activity did we observe a statistically significant effect of efficiency on
contributions.
______
Tables 1 and 2 about here
______
What then did drive contributions? One variable, the lagged log of fundraising
expenditures, was statistically significant at the 0.001 level across 5 out of the 6
subsectors in our model and at the 0.01 in the sixth. Given the fact that efficiency
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positioning did not appear to be a factor in determining the level of contributions
received, these are intriguing and substantively significant findings. They indicate that
nonprofit organizations that spend more marketing themselves to the donating public do
better at raising contributed income. No matter the field of activity, positioning around
mission influenced the flow of contributions. These results strongly support the second of
the two hypotheses we defined earlier.8
With R-Squares ranging from .13 to .44 our models did only moderately well in
predicting contributions. Still, in order to assure ourselves that concerns over errors in the
completion of the 990 Forms might have skewed our results, we did a sensitivity analysis.
On the assumption that nonprofit managers may not fully understand the various
reporting categories of contributions, we estimated another version of our model using
total contributions as the dependent variable.  A general pattern emerged with the
coefficient estimates similar in both sign and magnitude, which suggests that any
“problematic” Form 990 filers do not pose a threat to our analysis.9
We believe that the results of the analysis are important for two reasons. First,
they cast doubt upon the wisdom, at least in part, of the growing tidal wave of advice that
nonprofit organizations are receiving from the new literature on nonprofit management.
While tighter operations, leaner staffing, and other tools designed to lower administrative
costs might well increase margins on earned or commercial income within some
nonprofits, such steps appear not to impress or influence contributors. Second, the results
in our model, particularly the significance of fundraising expenses, indicate that when the
more donative nonprofits carry their message to funders aggressively, they often reap
rewards in the form of higher contribution levels. Our findings suggest that giving may
17
still be driven more by donor identification with organizations than by economizing and
positioning based on low administrative expense ratios.
In light of these conclusions, arguments about bringing a new bottom line to the
nonprofit sector will need to be based on something other than a claim that donors
recognize and reward efficiency by increasing contributions to lean organizations. It may
be that efficiency is critical to ensuring that the commercial side of nonprofit operations
maximizes earned income. Who after all could quarrel with the logic of a claim that
organizations with lower overhead and administrative costs are in a better position to
increase the revenue derived from fees for service and ventures? However, when it comes
to attracting the critical contributed income on which many nonprofits rely to fuel their
charitable activities, particularly services that are offered to disadvantaged populations,
operational efficiency does not appear to be a critical consideration in the eyes of
contributors.
V. DISCUSSION
Some will surely object that efficiency has been shortchanged in this analysis.
After all, proper marketing, positioning, and fundraising strategy only assure that an
organization has made its case to the public, not that an organization has a record of
efficient operation that will ensure its survival in the competitive environment of the
increasingly commercial nonprofit sector. More than anyone else, Willliamson (1994) has
voiced a clear objection to the emphasis on strategy in the broader management literature.
Williamson has forcefully argued that excessive concern over strategy and positioning
obscures the fact that efficiency remains a more critical factor to organizational success
and that economizing is much more fundamental than strategizing. Williamson’s point
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was that strategizing efforts will rarely prevail if a program is burdened by significant
cost excesses in production, distribution, or organization. His conclusion was simple and
direct: “Economizing is more fundamental than strategizing – or, put differently…
economy is the best strategy. That is the central and unchanging message of the
transaction cost economics perspective” (Williamson 1994:362).
Although these strong words were directed at all firms that operate in competitive
markets, it is not clear that they hold true for nonprofits operating in the contributions
market. When nonprofits engage in fundraising to support their charitable missions and
make appeals based on emotion and urgency rather than efficiency and effectiveness, the
unchanging message of transaction cost economics appears in need of some modification,
both as a positive or normative conclusion. In fact, the results of this analysis indicate
that strategy, which in the nonprofit world means choosing a distinctive position rooted in
systems of activities that are difficult to match, may be a more viable approach to
attracting the contributions on which many nonprofit organizations still critically depend.
The importance of strategy over economizing is evidenced in the fact that
increased efficiency has often led to operational improvements in business firms, but
rarely have these gains translated into sustainable profitability (Porter 1996). Many large
business firms have become locked into hypercompetition, with the search for efficiency
only driving profit margins down and down. The move to tighten controls and improve
operational systems has had the effect of creating a rising tide of mutually destructive
competitive battles that damage the profitability of many companies. The irony of the
situation is clear: As managers push to improve on all fronts, they move further away
from viable competitive positions. As Porter has noted, operational effectiveness,
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although necessary to superior performance, is not sufficient because its techniques are
easy to imitate. In contrast, the essence of strategy is choosing a unique and valuable
position rooted in activities that are much more difficult to match. The economic basis of
competitive advantage can thus be traced down to the level of the specific mix of
activities within an organization and the fit of those activities in the market.
We believe this argument is strikingly relevant to the growing universe of
nonprofit organizations. Today, many nonprofits face increasing competition and
pressure as the sector’s financial needs expand faster than income. For many nonprofits,
the idea of economizing and lowering operational costs might appear appealing both as a
way of making earned income go further and as a signal to donors that contributions will
be used efficiently. While such a conclusion might conceivably hold for the commercial
side of nonprofit finance, our analysis suggests that economizing is not rewarded by
donors. Strategic positioning through the aggressive communication of mission is a more
potent driver of contributions than maintaining efficient operations. We conclude
therefore that the new literature on “bottom line” nonprofit management may well be
giving practitioners useful tools for tightening their fee-based operations, but it does not
appear to be helping nonprofits attract the contributions that remain critical to the ability
of many organizations to carry out their charitable missions.
An additional word about the other side of the giving equation is also in order.
While there has been much talk recently of an increasingly hard-nosed approach by the
funders of nonprofit organizations, our analysis of a decade of funding data suggests that
contributions remain for the most part unrelated to operational efficiency. In thinking
about how and why the financial performance of nonprofits does not affect donor
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decisions, it is reasonable to ask whether there is an adequate supply of information. The
answer is unclear at present.10 In fact, only within the past year has the IRS moved to put
in place new disclosure requirements for nonprofit organizations.  Nonprofits must now
mail their Form 990 to any interested party or post it on the Internet. This marks a major
change from the previous disclosure law, which only required that the forms be shown
upon request in a charity’s office. Few contributors ever made pilgrimages to see the
forms and the supply of information on the management of public charities was therefore
largely determined by what organizations chose to disclose in their annual reports.
Despite this recent reform, there is reason to believe that improvement in the
quantity and quality of information supplied to donors will not be instantaneous.  A study
of 990 returns from exempt organizations in twelve states, begun after the new disclosure
regulations took effect in June 1999, revealed that just 37% immediately fulfilled 990
requests, and 31% responded in ways coded as obfuscation—they referred survey takers
to another office, or required them to leave voicemail messages that were not returned
(Stokeld 1999). The study organizer suggested that many organizations appeared either to
be following a long-established process, or to have no process at all, for responding to
information requests. Whether 990s will become substantially more accessible in the
future depends on several unknowns, including how quickly organizations communicate
rules changes through their networks, and how aggressively the IRS is perceived to be
monitoring compliance. Still, it appears that government could do more both to inform
nonprofits of the rule change and to enforce disclosure requirements. This would require
that government take an active role in simplifying Form 990, communicating more
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directly with nonprofit organizations, and building a credible enforcement staff capable
of letting nonprofits know that disclosure is a critical responsibility.
There is at least one major development on the horizon that may help answer
questions about the supply of information. A new nonprofit organization has been formed
to disseminate financial information on nonprofits over the Internet. The project, known
as Guidestar, is still in its early stages, but it promises to overcome at least part of the
information problem. The Guidestar web site will allow any person to access the essential
financial data for a large number of nonprofit organizations. Information about operating
expenses, administrative overhead, and fund raising costs will all be available to potential
contributors and volunteers. The goal of the project is to make research on nonprofits
easier for the average donor by putting this data where it is easiest to access.
While Guidestar has promise, it will need to address a key obstacle: Major gaps in
what one might call the generally accepted accounting principles for nonprofits make it
hard to ensure the accuracy of reported information. This is especially problematic given
that Guidestar has also set up links to on-line giving programs. This allows contributors
to look up information and then make pledges on-line very quickly. The obvious
temptation for many charities will be to put their best foot forward and to engage in a
kind of strategic “gaming” aimed at making themselves look as efficient as possible.
With contributors’ dollars hanging in the balance, Guidestar may well end up fueling a
race to the bottom as charities use creative accounting techniques to control their image.
None of these technical problems is insurmountable with a few modest reforms,
including separating more clearly the reporting and fund-raising functions of the service
and developing a workable auditing system. To date, however, it remains unclear how
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aggressively Guidestar will counter these pressures, while ensuring the broadest possible
participation among nonprofits.
The problems associated with nonprofit accounting are significant enough to lead
Herzlinger to argue that the only real solution to the accountability problem in the
nonprofit sector may lie in the establishment of an SEC-type organization that could
ensure openness and disclosure as way of regulating through information (Herzlinger
1996). The principal role of a “nonprofit SEC” would be to be to bring uniform
accounting techniques to public charities, disseminate information on the financial
condition of organizations, and create channels through which donors, volunteers, clients,
and community members could access and use this information. Of course, this would be
a far more complex proposition in the nonprofit sector, in which lines of ownership are
overlapping and ill-defined, than in the business sector, in which one group of owners,
namely shareholders, have clear interests in accurate information. For information to
have a chance to work as regulation and for Herzlinger’s provocative idea of a “nonprofit
SEC” to have an opportunity to succeed, a major transformation is needed not just in the
kind of information that is made available, but in the outlook of the many stakeholders of
nonprofit organizations, including donors, clients and the general public.
We believe that ambivalence about some of the recent developments bearing on
nonprofit information may be wise. On the one hand, the creation of ever more
information about the management and finances of nonprofit organizations only bodes
well for increased transparency within the sector and for broader accountability. On the
other hand, it may not be entirely problematic that decisions about contributions remain
for the time being – as they have long appeared to be – largely driven by legitimacy and
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positioning. After all, one of the best reasons to give is that a charity has communicated a
clear and compelling mission with which donors can identify. Far from being an obstacle
to be overcome at any cost, we think the findings reported here could be interpreted as
pointing in the other direction. They remind us that contributors are still listening to
fundraising pleas and that social cause, organizational mission, and personal commitment
may all still matter in a sector not yet fully oriented toward efficiency.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Pooled Correlation Matrix for All
Variables
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Log of contributions 10.76 5.75
2. Efficiency* 0.17 0.17 -0.04
3. Log of program expenses* 16.20 2.81 0.17 -0.53
4. Log of fundraising expenses* 5.37 6.37 0.55 -0.05 0.11
5. Log of total revenue* 16.79 1.91 0.17 -0.14 0.77 0.11
6. Log of gov't grants & contracts* 5.51 6.87 0.31 -0.04 0.22 0.35 0.24 ---
* Lagged values of these variables were used in the regression analysis.
Table 2
Regression Models of the Log of Contributions
 Industry Subsector
Independent Variables Arts Education Health Human Service Public Benefit Other
Lagged Efficiency 0.937 0.745 0.567 0.863 -0.387 -0.615
(0.565) (0.404) (0.459) (0.603) (0.956) (0.989)
Lagged log of program expenses 0.058 0.304*** 0.046 0.049 0.085 0.071
(0.061) (0.050) (0.036) (0.047) (0.076) (0.082)
Lagged Log of fundraising expenses 0.054** 0.064*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.173***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.028) (0.043)
Lagged log of total revenue 0.118 0.150* -0.016 0.497*** 0.091 -0.108
(0.101) (0.070) (0.078) (0.094) (0.118) (0.136)
Lagged Log of gov't grants & contracts 0.028 0.005 0.055*** 0.044** 0.014 0.042
(0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.021) (.038)
Constant 9.854 5.072 8.335 0.294 7.501 10.14
(1.618) (1.090) (1.184) (1.311) (2.147) (2.305)
Observations 1130 6250 10380 3350 1600 880
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.36 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < .05; ** p < .01;  *** p < .001.
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Notes
                                                          
1 Over the past decade a number of major financial scandals have rocked the
nonprofit world, including the conviction and imprisonment of the president of the
United Way of American for embezzlement, the jailing of the head of Foundation for
New Era Philanthropy for perpetrating an enormous investment fraud that turned out to a
massive ponzi scheme designed to separate donors and institutions from their money, and
prosecution of leaders of the Espiscopa and Baptist churches for outright theft. If crimes
were not enough, ethical lapses have also hurt the credibility o the sector and some its
largest institutions. The ouster of the head of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People over the improper transfer of funds to the president’s
former mistress and the forced resignation of the president of Adelphi University
following revelations of high living made possible by an extraordinarily generous
compensation package did nothing but further tarnish the image of the sector.
2 The growth of a literature on nonprofit management has coincided with the
establishment of new nonprofit degree programs within business and public policy
schools.
3 Note, however, that total investment in fundraising and marketing may not be
reflected in reported expenditures since volunteers may assume significant
responsibilities in these areas.
4 Human service includes those organizations whose missions are related to crime,
employment, food/nutrition, housing/shelter, public safety, recreation/sports, and youth
development.
5 Public benefit includes those organizations whose missions are related to civil
rights, community development, philanthropy, science, technology and research
institutes.
6 Other includes all remaining major category groups under the NTEE system, such
as those organizations whose missions are related to environment and animals,
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international and foreign affairs, religious, mutual benefit and membership, and unknown
or unclassified.
7 The presence of autocorrelation was ascertained using the Durbin-Watson
statistic.
8 Three other variables had sporadic effect on contributions: program expenses in
education, total revenue in human service, and government grants and contracts in health
and human service.
9 Although the results of these regressions were not reported, they are available
upon request from the authors.
10 In testing the possibility of an information lag affecting contributions, we found
little evidence in the data to support the claim that information about the past efficiency
of an organization (going back several years) had any impact upon its present
contributions.
